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The Par01 Evidence Rule and 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods: Justifying 
Beijing Metals & Minerals Import /Export Corp. 
v. American Business Center, ~ n c .  * 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods1 (C.I.S.G. or the Convention) has 
been in force in the United States since 1988.~ Oddly, however, 
" version of this Note is being published concurrently in the International 
Trade and Business Law Journal. The author wishes to thank Professor Gabriel 
Moens for reviewing this Note. 
1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, opened for signature April 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 22 (19831, 19 I.L.M. 671 [hereinafter C.I.S.G.]. 
For brief summaries of the Convention's history, see JOHN 0. HONNOLD, 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 2-4 (1989) 
[hereinafter HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 
FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION $5 4-10 
(2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW]; Kazuaki Sono, The Vienna 
Sales Convention: History and Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1, 2-6 
(Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 1986); and Dennis J. Rhodes, Comment, The 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 
Encouraging the Use of Uniform International Law, 5 TRANsNAT'L LAW. 387, 391-95 
(1992) (highlighting the United States' participation in the Convention's history). 
For bibliographic information on C.I.S.G., see C.M. BIANCA & M.J. BONELL, 
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES 
CONVENTION 851-73 (1987); Grant R. Ackerman, Scholarly Commentary on Articles 
of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
21 CORNELL INTI L.J. 535, 537-73 (1988); and Peter Winship, A Bibliography of 
Commentaries on the United Nations International Sales Convention, 21 I N T ~  LAW. 
585 (1987), as updated in Peter Winship, Bibliography, 22 INPL LAW. 605 (1988); 
Peter Winship, A Bibliography of Commentaries on the United Nations 
International Sales Convention: An Update, 24 INTI LAW. 307 (1990); and Peter 
Winship, The U.N. Sales Convention: A Bibliography of English-Language 
Publications, 28 INT'L LAW. 401 (1994). 
To access the legislative history of the Convention by current article number, 
consult the index in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, a t  869-74. 
2. John Honnold, Introduction to the Symposium, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 419, 
419-20 (1988). 
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since that time only four reported U.S. cases have cited the 
C~nvention.~ The most recent of these, Beeing Metals & 
Minerals Import /Export Corp. u. American Business Center, 
Inc., held that the parol evidence rule applies to contracts 
governed by the C~nvention.~ Perhaps because the court 
reached this conclusion without any recorded analysis, and only 
in footnote, the conclusion generated little or no commentary in 
periodical literature until the spring of this year. Then the 
court's holding was deemed incorrect in a well-reasoned article 
by Professor Harry M. Fle~htner .~ This Note responds in part 
The Convention's purpose is a t  least two-fold: "to assure a uniform regime for 
. . . international sales contracts" and to "offer[] rules that will be more responsive 
than the traditional national laws to the effective needs of international trade." 
M.J. Bonell, Introduction to BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 1, a t  3, 9. 
3. Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Business Ctr., 
Inc., 993 F.2d 1178, 1182-83 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993); Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l 
Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed, 984 F.2d 58 
(2d Cir. 1993); Orbisphere Corp. v. United States, 726 F. Supp. 1344, 1355 n.7 (Ct. 
Int'l Trade 1989); Promaulayko v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 540 A.2d 893, 897 n.2 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Promaulayko v. 
Johns Manville Sales Corp., 562 A.2d 202 (N.J. 1989). Unreported U.S. cases citing 
C.I.S.G. include Graves Import Co. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., No. 92 Civ. 3655 
(JFK), 1994 WL 519996, a t  *5 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1994); Delchi Carrier, SpA v. 
Rotorex Corp., No. 88-CV-1078, 1994 WL 495787, at  *4-7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1994) 
(rnem.); S.V. Braun, Inc. v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., No. 91 Civ. 8484 
(LBS), 1994 WL 121680, at  *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1994) (rnem.); and Interag Co. v. 
Stafford Phase Corp., No. 89 CIV. 4950 CSH, 1990 WL 71478, at  *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 
22, 1990) (rnem.). 
4. Beging Metals, 993 F.2d a t  1183 n.9. This holding contradicts the dictum 
of the district court in Filanto that "the Convention essentially rejects . . . the 
parol evidence rule." Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at  1238 n.7. 
5. Hany M. Flechtner, More U.S. Decisions on the U.N. Sales Convention: 
Scope, Par01 Evidence, Validity" and Reduction of Price Under Article 50, 14 J.L. 
& COM. 153, 158 (1995). Others have similarly concluded that the parol evidence 
rule is largely inconsistent with C.I.S.G., though this Note responds primarily to 
Professor Flechtner's article, which directly addresses the BeGing Metals holding. 
See HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 1, 8 110, a t  170-71 ("[Tlhe language of 
Article 8(3) . . . seems adequate to override any domestic rule that would bar a 
tribunal from considering the relevance of other agreements."); Ronald A. Brand & 
Harry M. Flechtner, Arbitration and Contract Formation in International Trade: 
First Interpretations of the U.N. Sales Convention, 12 J.L. & COM. 239, 251, 252 
(1993) ("By requiring consideration of 'all relevant circumstances'-including 
'negotiations'-without excepting situations where the parties embodied their 
agreement in a writing, [article 8(3)] does overrule certain traditional applications 
of the parol evidence rule"; yet "while the rather impenetrable applications of the 
parol evidence rule in our domestic law tradition should have little or no 
precedential value for contracts governed by CISG, the basic principles behind the 
rule remain viable under the Convention."); John E. Murray, Jr., An Essay on the 
Formation of Contracts and Related Matters Under the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8 J.L. & COM. 11, 44 (1988) 
("CISG rejects the parol evidence rule in the most frugal terms."); Peter Winship, 
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to that article, seeking to justify the court's elliptic conclusion 
in BeGing Metals. The response is essential, first because the 
holding in Becing Metals sets an important precedent for a 
fledgling area of U.S. jurispruden~e,~ and second because the 
decision will remain persuasive authority for courts around the 
world. In the Convention's own terms, courts applying the 
C.I.S.G. should give "regard . . . to its international character 
and to the need to promote uniformity in its appli~ation."~ 
Domesticating International Commercial Law: Revising U.C.C. Article 2 in Light of 
the United Nations Sales Convention, 37 LOY. L. REV. 43, 57 (1991) [hereinafter 
Winship, Domesticating International Law] (suggesting that the parol evidence rule 
is largely inconsistent with article 8(3) of the Convention). 
The conclusion that C.I.S.G. displaces the parol evidence rule finds some 
support in the Convention's legislative history. During the seventh meeting of the 
First Committee, the Canadian representative proposed the addition of a new 
paragraph to current article 11. See U.N. Conference on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 1st Comm., 7th mtg., 1 82, a t  270, U.N. Doc. 
AKONF.97119 (1980), in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, a t  491. 
The new paragraph would have restricted the admissibility of testimony 
contradicting a written contract. Report of the First Committee, U.N. Conference on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1st Comm., art. 10, 1 3, a t  90, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.97119 (1980), in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, a t  
662. The proposed paragraph read: 
Between the parties to a contract of sale evidenced by a written 
document, evidence by witnesses shall be inadmissible for the purposes of 
confuting or altering its terms, unless there is prima facie evidence 
resulting from a written document from the opposing party, from his 
evidence or from a fact the existence of which has been clearly 
demonstrated. However, evidence by witnesses shall be admissible for 
purposes of interpreting the written document. 
Id. The Japanese representative objected to this proposal because he believed it to 
be essentially a "restatement" of the rigid and difficult to apply parol evidence 
rule. U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1st Comm., 
7th mtg., 1 84, at  270, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.97119 (1980), in HONNOLD, 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, a t  491. Though a t  least two representatives 
favored the amendment, the Canadian proposal "did not seem to command wide 
support" and was not adopted by the Committee. Id. 1 86. From this i t  might be 
assumed that the parol evidence rule was rejected by the drafters of C.I.S.G. 
However, the limitation on testimony proffered by the Canadian representative was 
triggered by the mere existence of a writing. Id. 'j[ 84. Because the U.S. parol 
evidence rule, in contrast, is triggered by the integrationist intent of the parties, 
that rule was not explicitly rejected by the Committee along with the Canadian 
proposal. 
6. As noted in Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., "there is as yet 
virtually no U.S. case law interpreting the Sale of Goods Convention." 789 I?. Supp. 
a t  1237. Yet, "it may safely be predicted that this will change[, for] absent a 
choice-of-law provision, and with certain exclusions not here relevant, the 
Convention governs all contracts between parties with places of business in 
different nations, so long as both nations are signatories to the Convention." Id. 
(citing C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. l(l)(a), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  22, 19 I.L.M. 
a t  672). 
7. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 7(1), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at  23, 19 I.L.M. 
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Thus, courts worldwide will need to consider the U.S. precedent 
in Becing Metals in interpreting the Convention in the f u t ~ r e . ~  
At first glance, this Note's attempt to justify the Becing 
Metals holding may appear to be an attack on the strictly 
international approach to C.I.S.G. interpretation, an approach 
which many view as essential to the Convention's success and 
which decries the use of domestic law.' The Note should be 
a t  673. 
8. See Eva Diederichsen, Commentary to Journal of Law & Commerce Case 
I: Oberlandesgericht, Frankfurt am Main, 14 J.L. & COM. 177, 177 (1995) 
("[Clonsideration has to be given to court decisions in the various countries 
concerning the interpretation of the C.I.S.G. . . . ."); John Honnold, The Sales 
Convention in Action-Uniform International Words: Uniform Application?, 8 J.L. & 
COM. 207, 211 (1988) [hereinafter Honnold, Uniform Application] ("In view of the 
mandate in Article 7(1) . . . courts in States that adopt the Sales Convention 
should have no doubt as to their responsibility to consider interpretations in other 
countries."); John 0. Honnold, Uniform Laws for International Trade: Early 'Care 
and Feeding' for Uniform Growth, 1 IN?SL TRADE & BUS. L.J. 1, 8 (1995) 
[hereinafter Honnold, Care and Feeding] ("[Tlhe Sales Convention's call for 
interpretation 'to promote uniformity in [the Convention's] application . . .' [is] a 
mandate that clearly calls for due regard for interpretations in other countries.") 
(second alteration in original). But cf. BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 1, at  92 ("A 
judge . . . faced with a question of interpretation of the Convention may discover 
that . . . divergent solutions have been adopted by the different national courts. As 
long as the conflicting decisions are rather isolated and rendered by courts of first 
instance, or the divergencies are to be found even within one and the same 
jurisdiction, it is still possible either to choose the most appropriate solution among 
the different ones so far proposed or to disregard them altogether and attempt to 
find a new solution."); Kenneth Sutton, Methodology in Applying Uniform Law for 
International Sales (Under the UN Convention) (Vienna 1980), in LAW AND 
AUSTRALIAN LEGAL THINKING IN THE 19805 91, 92 (1986) ("[Ilf a body of caselaw 
were established in relation to the Convention no doubt the Australian judiciary 
would seek to follow it in the interests of uniformity. But the persuasive value of 
a particular judgment in a foreign court could depend on its reputation, its status, 
the extent to which its decisions were binding on inferior courts and the coverage 
of the national reporting system.") (discussing in general how Australia would 
apply the Convention). 
To aid in the consideration of foreign decisions, "UNCITRAL [(the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law) has] established procedures for 
gathering and disseminating decisions applying the Sales Convention" as well a s  
for preparing, translating, and distributing summaries of those decisions. HONNOLD, 
UNIFORM LAW, supra note 1, $ 93. For information on how to obtain copies of 
decisions from UNCITRAL, see Honnold, Care and Feeding, supra, at  9 & n.19. 
9. See Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Conference on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 6, cmt. 1, at  17-18, U.N. Doc. 
AlCONF.97119 (1980), in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at  407- 
08 ("National rules on the law of sales of goods are subject to sharp divergencies 
in approach and concept. Thus, it is especially important to avoid differing 
constructions of the provisions of this Convention by national courts, each 
dependent upon the concepts used in the legal system of the country of the 
forum."); M.J. Bonell, Introduction to BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 1, at  19 ("The 
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viewed, however, as a healthy counterpoint to the widely 
supported internationalist approach. As such a counterpoint, 
the Note explores weaknesses in the strictly international 
position and may facilitate formulation of a more defensible 
strategy for applying C.I.S.G. 
In seeking to justify the Fifth Circuit's holding that the 
parol evidence rule applies to contracts governed by C.I.S.G., 
this Note will first summarize the mechanics of the parol 
evidence rule. Next the Note will review the facts and relevant 
holding of Beijing Metals. Finally, and most importantly, this 
Note will develop two arguments supporting that holding: first, 
that the parol evidence rule is essentially an expression of 
C.I.S.G. article 8 and serves the international uniformity goal 
of article 7, so that the rule legitimately may be applied under 
the Convention;'' and second, that the parol evidence rule 
addresses a problem governed but left unresolved by the 
Convention and conforms to general principles underlying the 
Convention, so that the rule may be applied to C.I.S.G. 
contracts. Based on these two arguments, the Note concludes 
that the Fifth Circuit's application of the parol evidence rule 
may well have been justified, whether or not the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods also applied. 
Convention's main purpose is to bring about uniformity a t  a world-wide level in 
the law of international sales contracts. To this end i t  is . . . . important that its 
provisions be interpreted in the same way in various countries."); Ackerman, supra 
note 1, a t  535-36 ("[C.I.S.G.] is a transnational law with a transnational legislative 
history. Thus, its interpretation must also be transnational."); Flechtner, supra note 
5, a t  176 ("It is critical to the long term success of CISG that courts apply it from 
a perspective that transcends the purely domestic sales law concepts with which 
they are familiar."). 
Strict uniformity is not possible, however, unless courts are willing to follow 
uncritically the court that first interprets each C.I.S.G. provision, whether the 
court's interpretation is correct or not. When flawed interpretations arise, 
divergence in application of the Convention is clearly desirable. As John Homold 
noted in speaking of the U.C.C., "a carefully considered decision to differ from 
decisions in other Ijurisdictions] probably provides a healthy opportunity for 
reconsideration of doubtful decisions--a value that can counterbalance some degree 
of loss in uniformity." Homold, Care and Feeding, supra note 8, a t  8 11.17. 
10. But cf: Honnold, Uniform Application, supra note 8, a t  208-09 (treating 
"the tendency to think that the words we see are merely trying . . . to state the 
domestic rule we know so well" as a flawed approach to C.I.S.G. interpretation). 
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The parol evidence rule guides courts in the United States 
and other common law countries in their initial determination 
of the content of written contracts. Unfortunately, the U.S. 
version of the rule is not uniform. It has both statutory and 
varied common law manifestations. The statutory version 
-found in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)ll-applies 
to contracts governed by article 2 of that Code. Because both 
U.C.C. article 2 and the Convention govern sale of goods 
contracts,12 the U.C.C. version of the parol evidence rule is 
likely to apply to contracts covered by the Convention.13 
Yet there may be instances when the common law parol 
evidence rule will apply to C.I.S.G. contracts." The paradigm 
common law parol evidence rule, summarized in Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts,15 actually differs little from the 
statutory version. The basic operation of the two versions can 
thus be jointly outlined as  follow^.'^ 
In identifjTing the content of written contracts under the 
parol evidence rule, the court first asks whether the writing is 
partially integrated, that is, whether the writing is final and 
complete as to some terms.17 The court next asks whether the 
11. U.C.C. g 2-202 (1994). 
12. U.C.C. 2-102 ("[Tlhis Article applies to transactions in goods . . . ."); 
C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 1, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  22, 19 I.L.M. a t  672 ("This 
Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods . . . ."I; Flechtner, supra note 5, a t  
162. 
13. The fact that the U.C.C. parol evidence rule will apply to most contracts 
governed by C.I.S.G. minimizes any argument that the mere variety of parol 
evidence rules makes the rule inconsistent with C.I.S.G.'s goal of uniformity. 
14. Flechtner, supra note 5, at  161-65 (arguing that the contract in Beijing 
Metals may have been governed by C.I.S.G. even if, as the court found, it did not 
fall within the scope of U.C.C. article 2). 
15. Although common law parol evidence rules undoubtedly vary among the 
states, this Note will only deal with one common law parol evidence rule, that 
summarized in the Restatement. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
44 209-218 (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 2~1 .  
16. For more detailed-yet easy to follow--explanations of both the Restate- 
ment and U.C.C. parol evidence rules, see James D. Gordon 111, Teaching Par01 
Evidence, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 647. A more comprehensive look a t  the parol 
evidence rule generally is found in 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
ch. 26 (1960 & Supp. 1994). JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4 2-9 to -12 (2d ed. 1980) 
provides more extensive discussion of the U.C.C. parol evidence rule. 
17. See 2 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, 8 209(1) ("An integrated 
agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more 
terms of an agreement."); id. 210(2) ("A partially integrated agreement is an 
integrated agreement other than a completely integrated agreement."); U.C.C. § 2- 
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writing is a complete integration-whether i t  contains the 
"complete and exclusive" terms of the parties' agreement? 
Historically, courts used either of two approaches to determine 
whether a writing was a partial or complete integration. The 
Williston approach dictated that a court look primarily to the 
terms of the writing, as interpreted by a reasonable person in 
the circumstances, to determine whether an integration was 
intended.lg The Corbin approach instructed courts to look to 
all relevant evidence surrounding the agreement to decide 
whether the parties actually intended the writing to be 
complete and exclusive.20 Professor's Corbin's approach has 
been adopted by both the Restatement and the U.C.C.21 Thus, 
202 (defining what the Restatement calls an integration as "a writing intended by 
the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as 
are included therein"). 
18. 2 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, 8 210(1) ("A completely integrated 
agreement is an integrated agreement adopted by the parties as a complete and 
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement."); U.C.C. 8 2-202(b) (describing 
what the Restatement terms a completely integrated agreement as a "writing . . . 
intended . . . as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the 
agreement"). 
19. See 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 8 633, 
a t  1014-15 (3d ed. 1961) ("It is generally held that the contract must appear on its 
face to be incomplete in order to permit par01 evidence of additional terms."); id. at 
1016 ("If upon inspection and study of the writing, read, it may be, in the light of 
surrounding circumstances to insure its proper understanding and interpretation, it 
appears to contain the engagement of the parties, and to define the object and 
measure the extent of such engagement, i t  constitutes the contract between them, 
and is presumed to contain the whole of that contract.") (quoting Eighmie v. 
Taylor, 98 N.Y. 288, 294-95 (1885)); see also 1 WILLISTON, supra, 8 95, a t  349-50 
("It is even conceivable that a contract may be formed which is in accordance with 
the intention of neither party. If a written contract is entered into, the meaning 
and effect of the contract depends on the interpretation given the written language 
by the court. The court will give that language its natural and appropriate 
meaning; and, if the words are unambiguous, will not even admit evidence of what 
the parties may have thought the meaning to be."). 
20. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 16, 8 582, a t  455 (In determining whether the 
parties intended their written agreement to be an integration, "no relevant 
testimony should be excluded. . . . This is what the wiser courts, seeking justice in 
each case, have in truth been doing."); see also Arthur L. Corbin, The 
Interpretation of Words and the Par01 Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 161 
(1965) (attacking the position "that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to aid the 
court in the interpretation of a written contract (an integration) if the written 
words are themselves plain and clear and unambiguous"). 
21. See 2 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, 88 209 cmt. c, 210 cmt. b, 214; 
U.C.C. 8 2-202 cmt. 1. Under the Restatement: 
That a writing was or was not adopted as a completely integrated 
agreement may be proved by any relevant evidence. A document in the 
form of a written contract, signed by both parties and apparently 
complete on its face, may be decisive of the issue in the absence of 
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modern courts applying the Restatement or U.C.C. tests 
consider extrinsic evidence and focus on the parties' actual 
intent in determining whether a written contract is a partial or 
complete intregration. 
If the court determines that a writing is a partial 
integration, "evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements 
or negotiations is not admissible . . . to contradict a term of the 
writing."22 Nevertheless, the partial integration "may be 
explained or supplemented . . . by evidence of consistent 
additional terms,"23 unless "the additional terms are such 
that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included 
in the document"24 or are such "as in the circumstances might 
naturally be omitted fkom the writing."25 If the writing is 
deemed a complete integration, not even "consistent additional 
terms" may be admitted to supplement the writing.26 Whether 
credible contrary evidence. But a writing cannot of itself prove its own 
completeness, and wide latitude must be allowed for inquiry into 
circumstances bearing on the intention of the parties. 
2 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, $ 210 cmt. b. 
[U.C.C.] section [2-202 likewise] rejects: 
(a) Any assumption that because a writing has been worked out which 
is final on some matters, it is to be taken as including all the matters 
agreed upon; 
(b) The premise that the language used has the meaning attributable 
to such language by rules of construction existing in the law rather than 
the meaning which arises out of the commercial context in which it was 
used; and 
(c) The requirement that a condition precedent to the admissibility of 
the type of evidence specified in paragraph (a) is an original 
determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous. 
U.C.C. $ 2-202 cmt. 1; see also ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET AL., COMMON LAW AND 
EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1 3.05[2] (1985) ("Presumably 
under the Code, which seeks to enforce the parties' bargain in fact, [the] common- 
law [four corners] approach has been displaced and extrinsic evidence will be 
admitted as a preliminary matter to determine the intentions of the parties on 
integration of their agreement. At any rate, this more liberal approach . . . can be 
employed under the Code . . . .") (footnote omitted); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 
16, 8 2-10, at  79 ("Comment 3 to 2-202 may reject a four corners test."). 
22. 2 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, 8 215; see also U.C.C. $ 2-202 ("Terms 
. . . set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their 
agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be 
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral 
agreement . . . ."). 
23. U.C.C. 8 2-202; see also 2 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, $ 216(1) 
("Evidence of a consistent additional term is admissible to supplement [a partially] 
integrated agreement . . . ."I. 
24. U.C.C. $ 2-202 cmt. 3. 
25. 2 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, 8 216(2)(b). 
26. Id. 8 216(1); U.C.C. 5 2-202(b). 
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the writing is integrated or not, evidence of usage of trade, 
course of dealing, and course of performance is admissible to 
explain or supplement the agreement.27 Similarly, regardless 
of whether the writing is integrated, evidence of "[algreements 
and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption 
of a writing are admissible . . . to establish . . . the meaning of 
the writing."28 
The parol evidence rule, then, focuses on the intention of 
the parties. Their intent, circumstantially manifest, determines 
whether their written agreement is an integration and defines 
the terms of their writing. The rule thus seeks to ensure that 
the parties' expectations and understandings will not be 
frustrated by extrinsic eviden~e.~' In addition, the parol 
evidence rule is intended to effect at  least three public policies: 
to protect "written contracts against perjured or otherwise 
unreliable testimony of oral terms," to exclude "prior 
agreements which have been superseded by the [written 
contract], under a theory of merger," and to motivate "parties 
to put their complete agreement in writing."30 It may have 
been with these valuable policies in mind that the court in 
27. U.C.C. $ 2-202; see 2 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, $ 222(3) (usage of 
trade); id. $ 223(2) (course of dealing). It should be noted that Restatement $0 222 
and 223 are not classed with the Restatement's parol evidence provisions. 
28. 2 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, $ 214. The Restatement even allows 
"extrinsic evidence [to] . . . change the plain meaning of a writing." Id. # 212 cmt. 
b. The U.C.C., on the other hand, does not expressly admit parol evidence to aid 
in interpreting a writing. The U.C.C. does, however, permit evidence of "course of 
dealing or usage of trade . . . or . . . course of performance" to alter the meaning 
of the writing. U.C.C. $ 2-202ta). In addition, "[c]onsistent with [the] definition of 
agreement [adopted in U.C.C. $ 1-201(3)1, the Code directs courts to admit extrinsic 
evidence liberally to determine the meaning of the words of the agreement. . . . 
[Like the Restatement, tlhe Code thus displaces the common-law plain meaning 
rule." HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 21, 1 3.07[2][a][i], a t  3-34 (footnote omitted); see 
also Task Force of the A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk 
Transfers, and Documents of Title, Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, 
An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial 
Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J .  CORP. L. 981, 1048 (1991) (suggesting that 
the revised U.C.C. should clarify that the Code rejects the plain meaning rule in 
the interpretation of written contracts, though apparently advocating the rule "that 
extrinsic evidence is admissible if 'relevant to prove a meaning to which the 
language is reasonably susceptible'") (quoting A. Kemp Fisheries, Inc. v. Castle & 
Cooke, Inc., 852 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
29. See WHITE & S-RS, supra note 16, $ 2-9, a t  76 ("[A] rule [such as 
U.C.C. 9 2-2021 . . . is supposed to provide added assurance that the court will 
arrive at  the truth as to disputed terms."). 
30. Gordon, supra note 16, at  647 (citing J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS 137 (3d ed. 1987)). 
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Beijing Metals applied the parol evidence rule to exclude 
evidence of contemporaneous oral agreements. 
The facts of Beijing Metals are, in reality, of little 
relevance to this Note, as this Note's purpose is not to 
determine whether C.I.S.G. governed the Beijing Metals 
contra~t,~'  nor whether the Fifth Circuit reached an accurate 
conclusion under the parol evidence rule. This Note assumes 
that the Beijing Metals contract fell within the Convention's 
scope and rather asserts, as explained above, that the court 
nonetheless justifiably found the parol evidence rule applicable. 
Because this conclusion is a proposition of law, it may be 
evaluated in isolation from the facts. Nevertheless, a brief 
overview of the Beijing Metals facts will illustrate the type of 
situation which gives rise to the legal issue with which this 
Note deals. 
American Business Center, Inc. (ABC), an American 
marketer,32 entered into a deal with Beijing Metals & 
Minerals ImpoNExport Co. (MMB), a manufacturing concern 
organized under the law of and doing business in the People's 
Republic of China,33 for the production and marketing of 
exercise equipment.34 In violation of the parties' modified 
agreement, ABC "refused to pay for approximately 27 
shipments totalling more than $1.2 million. 7735 MMB warned 
that it would cease scheduled shipments unless ABC tendered 
a payment plan.36 Representatives of ABC and MMB met and 
negotiated a written agreement in which ABC recognized its 
debt and committed to pay its obligation in specified 
 installment^.^? Allegedly, the parties orally agreed to two 
additional terms: that MMB "would ship goods to compensate 
for [previous] non-conforming and defective goods and 
31. Professor Flechtner argues that the contract in Beijing Metals may well 
have been governed by C.I.S.G. Flechtner, supra note 5, at 163. The court in 
Beijing Metals, however, did not decide the issue. See Beijing Metals, 993 F.2d at 
1183 n.9. 
32. Flechtner, supra note 5, at 154; see also Beijing Metals, 993 F.2d at 1179- 
80. 
33. Beijing Metals, 993 F.2d at 1179 n.1; Flechtner, supra note 5, at 154. 
34. Beijing Metals, 993 F.2d at 1179-80. 
35. Id. at 1180. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
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shortages" and that MMB would make new shipments on a 
"'document against acceptance'" basis, giving "ABC 90 days to 
pay" for shipments (i.e., D/A After these negotiations 
had been concluded, MMB informed ABC that MMB would not 
allow D/A 90 terms;39 ABC thereupon refused to comply with 
the agreement.40 MMB sued to enforce the   on tract.^' In 
defense, ABC argued that MMB had breached at  least one of 
the alleged oral The district court held and the Fifth 
Circuit agreed "that ABC [was] barred by the parol evidence 
rule from introducing extrinsic evidence to alter the terms of 
the written agreement."43 Thus, against a claim of oral 
alteration, the payment agreement stood, to ABC7s detriment. 
Had the parol evidence rule not been applied, the case's 
outcome may well have been different? 
IV. JUSTIFYING THE COURT'S HOLDING 
Professor Flechtner takes issue with the Beijing Metals 
holding, arguing that the parol evidence rule is inconsistent 
with C.I.S.G. because "the Convention rejects any special 
methodology [such as the parol evidence rule] for determining 
the parties' intent as to the effect of a writing."45 Professor 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 1181. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 1182. 
43. Id. at  1184. 
44. See Flechtner, supra note 5, a t  165 (arguing that if the payment 
agreement in Beijing Metals fell "within the scope of CISG . . . , the Fifth Circuit 
should have applied the Convention's approach to parol evidence questions-with 
results likely to differ from those the court obtained by applying the Texas 
common law parol evidence rule"). 
45. Id. at 158. In reaching this conclusion, Professor Flechtner essentially 
concedes that, because the modern parol evidence rule admits extrinsic evidence to 
guide the interpretation of written contracts, article 8(3) is consistent with the 
parol evidence rule when the rule is applied to interpretation. See Flechtner, supra 
note 5, at 157-58; see also Brand & Flechtner, supra note 5, at 252 ("Evidence of 
prior negotiations going to the interpretation of a written contract is admissible 
under CISG just as it is under the parol evidence rule."). Compare 2 RESTATEMENT 
2D, supra note 15, $ 212 illus. 4 (If buyer and seller orally agree that buy means 
sell and sell means buy, their oral agreement will control the interpretation of 
their written contract.) with BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 1, at  98 (Under article 
8(1), if seller and buyer agree "to show a price of 50,000 in the contract, rather 
than the true price of 100,000, . . . their contract will be interpreted according to 
their common understanding, 100,000 not 50,000."). This Note thus assumes that 
the application of the parol-evidence rule to interpretive questions may be viewed 
as an implementation of the Convention and focuses on establishing that the rule 
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Flechtner seeks support for this conclusion from C.I.S.G. 
articles 7(1) and 8(3) and, in particular, from the fact that the 
Convention Yack[s] . . . any provision . . . affording special 
treatment to parol evidence  question^."^^ Inasmuch as 
Professor Flechtner's conclusion is based on the absence of a 
C.I. S .G. parol evidence provision, his conclusion is incorrect. If 
the Convention did give special treatment to the parol evidence 
issue, that treatment would either support or displace 
application of the parol evidence rule. When the Convention 
does not give special treatment to a rule of law, however, the 
rule is not automatically displaced. Instead, the rule's fate 
depends on whether the Convention settles issues within the 
rule's scope against the rule, and if the Convention does not 
settle those issues, on whether the rule conforms with the 
general principles of the C~nvention.~' This section argues 
first that C.I.S.G. article 8 settles questions regarding both the 
determination of the parties' intent as to the effect of their 
writing and the admissibility of extrinsic evidence consistently 
with the parol evidence rule so that courts may apply the parol 
evidence as an expression of article 8. This initial argument is 
buttressed by the fact that the parol evidence rule satisfies the 
international uniformity mandate of article 7(1).~~ Second, this 
section alternatively contends that C.I.S.G. governs but does 
not expressly settle parol evidence issues and that the parol 
evidence rule conforms "with the general principles [of 
C.I.S.G.] ," so that, consistent with article 7(2), the parol 
evidence rule may be applied to C.I.S.G. ~ontracts.~' 
A. The Par01 Evidence Rule: An Application of Article 8 
Consistent with the International Mandate of Article 7 
1. The parol evidence rule as an application of article 8 
Article 8 essentially dictates that in interpreting the effect 
of a written contract, the court should focus on each party's 
may also be seen as an application of C.I.S.G. when the rule is used to determine 
"the parties' intent as to the effect of [their] writing." Flechtner, supra note 5, at 
158. 
46. Flechtner, supra note 5, at 158. 
47. See C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 7(2), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at 23-24, 19 
I.L.M. at 673. 
48. See C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 7(1), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at 23, 19 
I.L.M. at 673. 
49. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 7(2), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at 24, 19 I.L.M. 
at 673. 
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subjective intent if that intent was known by or "could not have 
been" unknown to the other party;" otherwise the court 
should look to the parties' objective intent, that is, "to the un- 
derstanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the 
other party would have had in the same  circumstance^."^^ 
More importantly, in assessing the parties' subjective intent or 
the understanding of a similarly situated reasonable person, 
the court is to give "due consideration . . . to all relevant cir- 
cumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices 
which the parties have established between themselves, usages 
and any subsequent conduct of the parties."52 Thus, article 8 
instructs courts to consider circumstantial parol evidence in 
interpreting the effect of written contracts. 
At first glance, then, the parol evidence rule appears incon- 
sistent with article 8. If the modern version of the rule did 
prevent consideration of all parol evidence or if it embraced 
Professor Williston's limited approach to determining integra- 
tionist intent," the rule would clearly be inconsistent with 
article 8.54 If inconsistent, the rule would just as clearly be 
50. Id. at  art. 8(1). 
51. Id. at  art. 8(2); see Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. CONFERENCE ON 
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS art. 7 ,  cmt. 4, at  18, U.N. 
Doc. AlCONF.97119 (1980), in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at  
408 (explaining the initial subjective and default objective inquiries mandated by a 
predecessor of article 8). 
52. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 8(3), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at  24, 19 I.L.M. 
at  673. 
53. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
54. The legislative history of article 8 makes clear that courts applying the 
Convention should consider extrinsic evidence in identifying the terms and effect of 
a contract regardless whether the contract is embodied in a writing or whether the 
writing appears clear on its face. See Report of the Working Group on the Interna- 
tional Sale of Goods on the Work of its Eighth Session, [I9771 VIII U.N. Comm'n 
Int'l Trade L. Y.B. 155, 168, at  86, 87, U.N. Doc. NCN.9ISER.Nl977, in  
HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at  287, 288 (documenting that a 
provision that was part of a predecessor to article 8 and that required the circum- 
stances listed in article 8(3) "to be considered, even though they have not been 
embodied in writing or in any special form" was deleted because it was deemed 
unnecessary, likely because the predecessor to article 8 already made this principle 
clear); Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Conference on Contracts for the Inter- 
national Sale of Goods, art. 7 ,  cmts. 5,  6 ,  at  18, U.N. Doc. NCONF.97119 (1980), in  
HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at  408 ("In determining the intent 
of a party or the intent a reasonable person would have had in the same circum- 
stances, i t  is necessary to look first to the words actually used or the conduct en- 
gaged in. However, the investigation is not to be limited to those words or conduct 
even if they appear to give a clear answer to the question. . . . In order to go 
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displaced by C.I.S.G.55 The legislative history and language of 
article 8, however, indicate that the parol evidence rule may 
well be viewed as consistent with article 8. 
a. The legislative history of article 8. Article 8 under- 
went significant modification as it progressed through the legis- 
lative process that led to its incorporation into the Conven- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  Early in its formulation, the future article 8(3) read: 
The intent of the parties or the intent a reasonable person 
would have had in the same circumstances . . . [may] [is to] 
be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case 
including the [preliminary] negotiations, any practices which 
the parties have established between themselves, any conduct 
of the parties subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, 
usages . . . and any applicable legal rules for contracts of 
sale .57 
The italicized clause may well have accommodated application 
of the parol evidence rule in determining the subjective or 
objective intent of the parties, as the parol evidence rule is a 
legal rule that applies to contracts generally and is made appli- 
cable to "contracts of sale" specifically through section 2-202 of 
the u.C.C.~~ As article 8 evolved, the clause was deleted, not 
beyond the apparent meaning of the words or the conduct by the parties, article 
[8](3) states that 'due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of 
the case.'") (quoting a draft version of article 8(3)). 
55. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A111 Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."); see also 
Winship, Domesticating International Law, supra note 5, at  43 ("As a treaty made 
under the authority of the United States, the Convention is the 'supreme Law' of 
the United States and would prevail over conflicting state law.") (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
56. Compare, for example, article 14 of the Draft Convention on the Forma- 
tion of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as Approved or Deferred for 
Further Consideration by the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods at 
Its Eighth Session, [I9771 VIII U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. Y.B. 90, U.N. Doc. 
NCN.9ISER.Al1977, in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at  291, 
with the version of article 8 adopted by the Convention, C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 
8, S. TREA'IY DOC. NO. 9, a t  24, 19 I.L.M. a t  673. 
57. Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the 
Work of Its Eighth Session, [I9771 VIII U.N. Comrn'n Int'l Trade L. Y.B. 'll 155, a t  
86, U.N. Doc. AlCN.91SER.Nl977, in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
1, a t  287 (emphasis added) (brackets in original) (quoting a draft text of article 
14(4) of the 1964 Hague Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Inter- 
national Sale of Goods, which was under revision). 
58. Of course, this clip of legislative history is not determinative. While the 
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because it was inconsistent with the principles of article 8, but 
because it was deemed "unne~essary."~~ That legal rules appli- 
cable to sales contractsat least those rules consistent with 
article 8-would continue to apply in determining the parties' 
intent after the enactment of article 8 may thus have seemed 
apparent to the Working Group. Although the point is not as 
apparent to commentators today, this bit of legislative history 
suggests that the Convention may well accommodate the parol 
evidence rule, particularly since the rule is essentially an ex- 
pression of article 8.60 
b. The language of article 8. The text of article 8 sup- 
ports the conclusion that the parol evidence rule may be seen 
as an expression of that provision. As explained above, article 8 
instructs courts to determine the effect of a emtract according 
to the parties' subjective intent, or failing that, according to 
their objective intent?' Further, article 8 directs courts to look 
"to all relevant circumstances" in determining that intent.62 
The parol evidence rule implements these instructions. It re- 
quires the court to determine whether a writing is completely 
or partially integrated by looking to the intent of the parties,63 
intent that may be indicated "by any relevant evidence."64 Ini- 
tially at  least, the parol evidence rule appears a mere applica- 
tion of article 8? Yet the rule may require the use of what 
plain language of the italicized clause certainly could accommodate application of 
the parol evidence rule, the clause may well have had a different meaning to 
members of the Working Group. At the least, the clause raises doubts as to wheth- 
er article 8 was meant to categorically displace application of the parol evidence 
rule. But see U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1st 
Comm., 6th mtg., 1 51, a t  262, U.N. Doc. NCONF.97119 (1980), in HONNOLD, DOC- 
UMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at  483 (indicating the Australian representative's 
view that a blanket prohibition on parol evidence was inappropriate in internation- 
al trade and would be displaced by the later draft of article 8 that he was consid- 
ering). 
59. Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the 
Work of Its Eighth Session, 119771 VIII U.N. Comm'n Int l  Trade L. Y.B. ¶ 166, at  
87, U.N. Doc. NCN.91SER.AA977, in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
1, a t  288. 
60. But see supra note 5. 
61. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
62. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 8(3), S. TREAlr DOC. NO. 9, a t  24, 19 I.L.M. 
a t  673. 
63. See supra note 21. 
64. 2 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, !j 210 cmt. b. 
65. See Brand & Flechtner, supra note 5, a t  251 ("At bottom, the parol evi- 
dence rule is merely a particular application of the fundamental 'intent principle' of 
contract law . . . . Far from invalidating such a rule, CISG Article 8(3) emphasizes 
the importance of the parties' intent . . . ."); see also HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, 
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Professor Flechtner calls "a distinct set of tests and procedures 
for ascertaining . . . the partiesr intent]? "[Tlhe Conven- 
tion," he contends, clearly "rejects any special methodology for 
determining the parties' intent as to the effect of a writing."67 
supra note 1, $ 110, at  171 ("The Convention . . . would not interfere with the 
decision to exclude from a jury evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements if 
. . . 'the court finds' (after giving due consideration to all relevant circumstances) 
that the writing was 'intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the 
terms of the agreement.'") (quoting U.C.C. $ 2-202) (emphasis in HONNOLD, UNI- 
FORM LAW). 
66. Flechtner, supra note 5, at  158. Specifically, Professor Flechtner objects to 
the presumption that a writing is intended as an integration, see 2 RESTATEMENT 
2D, supra note 15, $ 209(3), and the rule, discussed supra notes 24-25, 26 and 
accompanying text, that consistent additional terms may be proved to supplement a 
partial integration only if those terms might reasonably have been omitted or, if 
adopted by the parties, would definitely have been recorded in the writing. See 
Flechtner, supra note 5, at  159-60. In response to Professor Flechtner's concerns, it 
should be noted that the presumption that a writing is intended as an integration 
is only explicit in the Restatement version of the parol evidence rule. See 2 RE- 
STATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, $ 209(3). Any conflict with article 8 that this pre- 
sumption might present is therefore marginalized by the fact that the U.C.C. ver- 
sion of the parol evidence rule will normally apply to sales contracts governed by 
C.I.S.G. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. Further, the presumption 
acts as a default, providing the court direction when the evidence does not indicate 
that the intent of the parties or of a reasonable person is contrary to the written 
agreement. See id. $ 209 cmt. c (stating that "[wlhether a writing has been adopt- 
ed as an integrated agreement is . . . to be determined in accordance with all 
relevant evidence" and indicating that the presumption of integration applies only 
"in the absence of contrary evidence"). In such situations, the Convention does not 
indicate what the court should do, so the court may legitimately look to domestic 
law for guidance, see infi-a notes 86-89 and accompanying text, and may certainly 
settle on a default such as the parol evidence rule which would appear internation- 
ally acceptable in these situations and which is consistent with the general princi- 
ple of the Convention, recognized in article 12, that Contracting States may protect 
their interests in written agreements, see infra part IV.B.4. 
As to Professor Flechtner's objection to the consistent additional terms rule, 
Professor Fletchner concedes that a t  least the Texas version of the rule "might [by 
itself] be an unobjectionable method for determining whether alleged terms form[] 
a transaction separate from the one integrated into a writing, and thus outside the 
intended preclusive scope of the integration." Flechtner, supra note 5, a t  160. Pro- 
fessor Flechtner's main objection is that the rule is so "encrusted by purely domes- 
tic precedent" that "[ilt would now be virtually impossible for a U.S. court to use 
the test in a manner that was genuinely 'international' and that would promote 
uniformity with decisions by courts of other contracting states" as article 7(1) in- 
tends. Id. That a rule is of domestic origin is not reason enough to reject it, how- 
ever. If the rule is not displaced by the Convention, is consistent with the Conven- 
tion, and promotes international uniformity in some way, the rule arguably re- 
mains valid under the Convention. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
67. Flechtner, supra note 5, at  158; see also Brand & Flechtner, supra note 5, 
a t  251 (Like the parol evidence rule, "CISG Article 8(3) emphasizes the importance 
of the parties' intent-although clearly the Convention does not adopt the some- 
what bizarre and abstruse methods for determining intent associated with the 
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Professor Flechtner's conclusion is not immune from dis- 
pute, however. The language of article 8 indicates that in deter- 
mining intent "due consideration is to be given to all relevant 
circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any prac- 
tices which the parties have established between themselves, 
usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties."68 Intent, 
then, is controlling; parol evidence must only be given "due 
consideration" under the Convention. The parol evidence rule 
implements article 8 by making intent the touchstone in deter- 
mining whether an integration exists and consequently wheth- 
er the parol evidence rule should apply to protect that integra- 
tion. Arguably, at least, the parol evidence rule also applies the 
instructions of article 8 by giving "due consideration . . . to all 
relevant circumstances of the case."69 Indeed, under the parol 
evidence rule, the judge considers "all relevant evidence" in 
determining the parties' intent to integrate.?' In addition, the 
rule admits to the fact finder evidence of usage of trade, course 
of dealing, and course of performance to interpret and augment 
the writing." And finally, if the writing is only partially inte- 
grated, the rule also generally admits "evidence of consistent 
additional terms" to explain or supplement the writing.72 
True, the parol evidence rule applies some objective tests 
or  presumption^,?^ but article 8 itself was intended to be less 
subjective than might be supposed. The drafters of article 8 
explicitly tempered its subjective focus by changing one of the 
triggers for application of the subjective test from "ought to 
have known" to "could not have been unaware what [the] intent 
parol evidence rule."). 
68. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 8(3), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at 24, 19 I.L.M. 
at 673 (emphasis added). 
69. Id. 
70. 2 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, 4 209 cmt. c; see supra note 21 and 
accompanying text. 
71. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
72. U.C.C. § 2-202(b); see supra notes 23-25, 26 and accompanying text. Of 
course, the parol evidence rule also admits all relevant evidence to aid in the in- 
terpretation of the writing. See supra notes 28, 29 and 45 and accompanying text. 
73. See supra notes 24-25, 26 and accompanying text. 
1364 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
was."" As a result, the subjective prong of article 8 will apply 
in few cases.75 
In sum, the parol evidence rule may be said to comply with 
the express terms and legislative intent of article 8. The ques- 
tion thus becomes whether the parol evidence rule, as an appli- 
cation of article 8, is consistent with article 7(l)'s instruction 
that "[iln the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be 
had to its international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in 
international trade."76 Professor Flechtner, of course, argued 
that it was not.?? If, in spite of Professor Flechtner7s argu- 
ment, the parol evidence rule may be said to be both consistent 
with article 8, as illustrated, and consistent with article 7(l)'s 
international thrust, then the holding in Beijing Metals that 
the parol evidence rule applies to contracts governed by the 
Convention is justifiable. It is therefore to a discussion of the 
parol evidence rule's consistency with article 7(1) that this Note 
turns. 
2. The parol evidence rule, promoting international uniformi- 
ty under article 7(1) 
While many have argued that the parol evidence rule is 
inconsistent with the uniformity of application sought by 
C.I.S.G., and while the rule is certainly attached to domestic 
precedent, the rule promotes uniformity and therefore satisfies 
74. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 
the Work of its Eleventh Session, [I9781 M U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. Y.B. 'f[ 34, 
a t  34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1978, in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 1, a t  368; id. 1 39 ("[Iln paragraph (1) the expression 'could not have been 
unaware what that intent was' replaced the expression 'ought to have known what 
that intent was'. This reflected the concern expressed in the Commission that the 
previous version of paragraph (1) contained too subjective a test.") (quoting pro- 
visions in the evolving drafts of what became article 8). 
75. See HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 1, $ 107, a t  164-65 ("[Blecause 
of the practical barriers to proving identity between the intent of the two parties 
. . . most problems of interpretation will be governed by paragraph (2) which fol- 
lows the 'objective' approach . . . ."); Paul Volken, The Vienna Convention: Scope, 
Interpretation, and Gap-Filling, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, supra note 1, at  
19, 45 (The subjective prong of article 8 "requires a qualified addressee, for it 
presupposes that the [addressee] knew or could not have been unaware of the 
speaker's intent. In most cases it cannot be proved that one is dealing with a 
qualified addressee." Consequently, article 8 provides a backup objective standard.). 
76. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 7(1), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  23, 19 I.L.M. 
a t  673. 
77. See Flechtner, supra note 5, at 158-59. 
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the demands of article 7(1) in at  least two senses.?' The parol 
evidence rule requires the judge, not the jury, to determine, a t  
least initially, the effect the parties intended for their writ- 
ing.79 C.I.S.G. "has . . . adherents from each economic and le- 
gal system of the ~or ld" ; '~  these systems also assign the in- 
terpretation of contracts to j~dges .~ '  The parol evidence rule 
- 
78. But cf: BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 1, a t  74 (arguing that "to have 
regard to the ['linternational characterr] of the Convention . . . implies the necessi- 
ty of interpreting its terms and concepts autonomously, . . . not by referring to the 
meaning which might traditionally be attached to them within a particular domes- 
tic law"). 
79. See 2 RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 15, $@ 209(2), 210(3) ("Whether there 
is an integrated agreement" as well as "[wlhether an agreement is completely or 
partially integrated is to be determined by the court as a question preliminary to 
determination of a question of interpretation or to application of the parol evidence 
rule." (emphasis added). While the Restatement characterizes the court's determina- 
tion as to the effect of a writing as preliminary to the application of the parol 
evidence rule, the determination may well be considered the threshold inquiry 
mandated by and therefore part of the rule.); U.C.C. $ 2-202 cmt. 3 (indicating 
that the court determines whether a writing was meant to be an integration); 
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, $ 2-9, a t  77 (outlining the allocation of adjudi- 
catory power between the judge and jury under the U.C.C. parol evidence rule); see 
also HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 1, $ 110, a t  171 ("[Tlhe parol evidence 
rule has its greatest significance in restricting the role of juries in the field of con- 
tract interpretation."); Brand & Flechtner, supra note 5, a t  252 11.47 ("From anoth- 
er  perspective, the parol evidence rule seems primarily a rule of procedure-i.e., it 
requires the judge rather than the jury to make the factual determination whether 
the parties intended to discharge prior or contemporaneous agreements that were 
not included in a writing. Clearly nothing in Article 8(3) or the rest of the Con- 
vention overrules this procedural aspect of the parole evidence rule.") (citation 
omitted); Winship, Domesticating International Law, supra note 5, at  57 ("To the 
extent that [the U.C.C. parol evidence rule] merely allocates the task of determin- 
ing the parties' intent between judge and jury, it is not inconsistent with the Con- 
vention.") (footnote omitted). 
80. Honnold, Care and Feeding, supra note 8, at  1; see generally Sara G. 
Zwart, The New International Law of Sales: A Marriage Between Socialist, Third 
World, Common, and Civil Law Principles, 13 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. F~EG. 109, 
114-23 (1988) (summarizing the eastern bloc and developing country perspectives 
on C.I.S.G. and discussing sensitive issues for eastern bloc, developing, common 
law, and civil law jurisdictions during the formation of the Convention). 
81. See Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal 
Courts, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 135-36 (1972) ("The jury has thus maintained its 
position mainly in the orbit of the common law . . . , but more than anywhere in 
. . . the United States, where trial by jury is standard in both criminal and civil 
cases. More than ninety per cent of the world's criminal jury trials, and nearly all 
of its civil jury trials, take place in the United States . . . ."); HERBERT J. 
LIEBESNY, FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 312 (1981) ("There 
is no jury trial in civil cases in France, or for that matter in other civil law coun- 
tries."); Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law-Its Functions, Methods and Usages, 22 
ARK. L. REV. & B. ASS3 J. 416 (1968), reprinted in JOHN H. MERRYMAN & DAVID 
S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 11, 17 (1978) ("In civil-law countries trial by jury is a rare exception in 
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thus brings U.S. courts into greater procedural harmony with 
courts of other nations in applying the Con~ent ion .~~ 
In addition, because judges are more likely than jurors to 
consider the international character of the Convention, the 
parol evidence rule increases the likelihood that U.S. courts 
will reach more internationally uniform results. Thus, although 
the rule may involve U.S. courts in a mechanically different 
inquiry in applying article g8," the rule allows American 
courts both to comply with the substance of article 8, as dis- 
cussed above, and to achieve more uniformity of result with 
courts of other countries. By reducing the involvement of juries, 
then, the parol evidence rule actually advances the 
Convention's uniformity goal. The parol evidence rule may thus 
be applied under the Convention, as the court concluded in 
Beijing Metals, as an appropriately international application of 
article 8. 
B. The Par01 Evidence Rule in Harmony with General 
Principles of the Convention 
This Note has argued that the parol evidence rule is justifi- 
ably applied to contracts governed by C.I.S.G., in part, because 
the rule is an implementation of article 8. That argument de- 
pends on the premise that the rule satisfactorily gives "due 
consideration . . . to all relevant circumstances" in determining 
the parties' intent, as mandated by article 8.84 Of course, it 
may be argued that the parol evidence rule does not satisfy this 
requirement. The Convention itself does not "expressly settle[" 
what constitutes due considerati~n.~~ The Convention dictates, 
criminal cases and never used a t  all in civil matters."). 
82. This increased uniformity is accomplished by the parol evidence rule alone 
and not by the Convention, for the Convention does not affect Contracting States' 
division of adjudicatory power between jury and judge. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, 
supra note 1, § 110, a t  171. 
83. This mechanically different inquiry may have been fashioned to deal with 
the challenges of jury trial and to bring jury trials into greater harmony with 
bench trials. See Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law-Its Functions, Methods and 
Usages, 22 ARK. L. REV. & B. ASS'N J. 416 (1968), reprinted in MERRYMAN & 
CLARK, supra note 81, a t  11, 17 ("Jury trial has . . . been the cause for the devel- 
opment of a special law of evidence, which . . . is one of the most complicated."); 
LIEBESNY, supra note 81, at  312 ("There is no jury trial in civil cases in France, or 
. . . in other civil law countries. Evaluation of the evidence thus is exclusively in 
the hands of trained judges and the rules are less strict than in common law."). 
84. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 8(3), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at  24, 19 I.L.M. 
a t  673. 
85. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 7(2), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at  23, 19 I.L.M. 
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however, that issues, such as this, which are governed but not 
expressly settled by the Convention "are to be settled in confor- 
mity with the general principles on which [the Convention] is 
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with 
the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private internation- 
al law."86 While favoring the Convention's general principles 
at  673 (emphasis added). It may, of course, be argued that characterization of the 
"due consideration" issue as a gap results from a skeptical, common law perspec- 
tive inconsistent with the Convention's international focus. See Paul Volken, The 
Vienna Convention: Scope, Interpretation, and Gap-Filling, in INTERNATIONAL SALE 
OF GOODS, supra note 1, at  19, 43 (quoting Ulrich Huber, Der UNCITRAL-Entwurf 
eines Uebereinkommens uber internationale Warenkaufiertrage, in RABELSZ 432-33 
(1979)). According to Ulrich Huber: 
The question of what has to be considered as a gap under the Conven- 
tion, cannot be answered on a mere rational basis. Someone who has a 
positive stand towards the Convention will discover but few gaps. On the 
other hand, if a person is skeptical about the international unification of 
the sales law, he [or shel will every now and then run into unsettled 
questions. In addition, a common law jurist, because of his [or her] legal 
tradition, will probably tend towards a more restrictive interpretation of 
the Convention and its provisions. Thus, he [or shel might more often be 
confronted with a gap, than would be a civil law jurist. Civil law jurists 
are more frequently used to work with generally framed, systematically 
conceived legal codes. Out of this experience, they are more readily pre- 
pared to solve unsettled questions or to fill gaps by referring to the gen- 
eral principles contained in the code itself. 
Id.; see also Honnold, Uniform Application, supra note 10, a t  210 (explaining that 
common law judges naturally will be more prone than civil law judges to find gaps 
in and less prone to extract underlying principles from C.I.S.G.). While common 
law lawyers may be more prone to find gaps in the Convention, the fact that the 
Convention defines gaps as matters governed but not expressly settled by the Con- 
vention, see BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 1, at  75, 76, certainly provides a basis 
for that proneness. 
86. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 7(2), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  23-24, 19 
I.L.M. a t  673. For a brief summary of the legislative history of article 7, see Peter 
Winship, Private International Law and the U.N. Sales Convention, 21 CORNELL 
INT~, L.J. 487, 509-15 (1988) [hereinafter Winship, Private International Law]. 
The general principles of which article 7(2) speaks may be found in "examina- 
tion of [the] various specific provisions of the [Convention]" and of the Convention's 
legislative history. Working Group on the International Sale of Goods; Report on the 
Work of the Second Session, 7-18 December 1970, [I9711 I1 U.N. Comm'n Int'l 
Trade L. Y.B. 1 132, a t  62, U.N. Doc. NCN.9ISER.Nl971, in HONNOLJ), DOCUMEN- 
TARY HISTORY, supra note 1, a t  68 (speaking of a predecessor of article 7(2) found 
in the Uniform Law on Sales); see also Report of the Working Group on the Inter- 
national Sale of Goods, First Session, 5-16 January 1970, [I9701 I U.N. Comm'n 
Int'l Trade L. Y.B. ¶ 59, at  182, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970, in HONNOLD, DOC- 
UMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, a t  20 (referring to the Uniform Law on Sales 
and explaining that "[tlhe general principles . . . are the general ideas which in- 
spired the Uniform Law . . . [and that tlhese principles can be gathered from the 
provisions of the Uniform Law, from the legislative history of the 1964 Hague 
Convention [which finalized the Uniform Law on Sales, see HONNOLD, DOCUMENTA- 
1368 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
over domestic law, this provision nonetheless permits courts to 
turn to domestic law in the first instance.87 When a gap ap- 
pears, the provision mandates resolution "in conformity with" 
the Convention's underlying principles.88 Thus, if a domestic 
law conforms to the principles of the Convention, that law may 
provide the rule of decision, just as it may when no general 
principles apply.89 It is particularly important, of course, that 
the domestic law satisfy the international uniformity mandate 
of article 7(1). In sum, in the possibly rare situations when a 
domestic law both satisfies the uniformity mandate and con- 
forms with other general principles underlying the Convention, 
that domestic law may be used to resolve issues left unsettled 
by the Convention. 
The parol evidence rule is such a law. The Beeing Metals 
holding-that the parol evidence rule applies to contracts gov- 
erned by the Convention-may thus be justified on this sepa- 
rate ground: that the parol evidence rule is a domestic law that 
resolves the unsettled issue of what constitutes "due consider- 
ation" in determining parties' intent, heeds the international 
uniformity directive of article 7(1), and conforms with general 
principles underlying the Con~ention.~' The parol evidence 
RY HISTORY, supra note 1, a t  I,] and from commentary on the Uniform Law."). 
87. But see Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods, 
First Session, 5-16 January 1970, [I9701 I U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. Y.B. 1 59, 
a t  182, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970, in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 1, at  20. By directing recourse to general principles, the drafters of a prede- 
cessor to Article 7(2) "wished to free judges from having to look to national law for 
the solution of these problems, an avenue that would lead to disunity." Id. When 
domestic law, like the parol evidence rule, conforms to general principles and en- 
hance uniformity, however, the drafters' concern over disunity resulting from na- 
tional law disappears or, ironically, may be best addressed through application of 
the domestic law. 
88. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 7(2), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at  23-24, 19 
I.L.M. a t  673. 
89. See id.; cf. Winship, Private International Law, supra note 86, a t  530 
(relying on the "in conformity" language of article 7(2) to suggest that courts need 
not turn to actual domestic law, but only to rules consistent with domestic law, 
when general principles fail to resolve issues governed by the Convention). But cf 
Diederichsen, supra note 8, a t  181. Diederichsen contends that "Irleliance upon 
domestic rules of conflict of law[, though possibly the only practical alternative 
when an issue is not resolved by C.I.S.G.,] . . . does not advance the uniform in- 
terpretation and application of the Convention as required by CISG, Article 7." Id. 
While Diederichsen's assertion may often be true, domestic rules like the parol 
evidence rule that actually enhance the uniform application of the Convention and 
that are otherwise consistent with the Convention's underlying principles satisfy 
the mandates of article 7 and therefore may apply to C.I.S.G. contracts. See supra 
part IV.A.2.; infia part IV.B.1-4. 
90. Alternatively, it may be argued that the principles underlying the Con- 
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rule clearly provides a solution to the "due consideration" prob- 
lem. As noted above, the parol evidence rule is also arguably 
consistent with the principle of international uniformity embod- 
ied in article 7(1)." Finally, the parol evidence rule is consis- 
tent with the good faith guideline of article 7 and the general 
principles manifest in articles 6 and 29; 9; 12 and 98. 
1. Article 7 
Aside from directing interpreting courts to consider the 
international character and uniformity goal of C.I.S.G., article 
7 instructs courts to interpret the Convention with regard "to 
the need to promote . . . the observance of good faith in interna- 
tional trade."92 This good faith paradigm "was intended to di- 
rect the attention of the courts in resolving disputes to the fact 
that the acts and omissions of the parties must be interpreted 
in the light of the principle that they observe good faith in 
international trade."g3 The parol evidence rule is consistent 
vention do not indicate what constitutes "due consideration," so that the court may 
turn to the domestic law applicable under conflicts rules for an answer. See 
C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 7(2), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  24, 19 I.L.M. a t  673 
("[Iln the absence of [relevant general] principles, [matters governed but unresolved 
by C.I.S.G. are to be settled] in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the 
rules of private international law."). Assuming that U.S. domestic law governs, the 
parol evidence rule would be the proper rule to apply, particularly since the rule is 
consistent with general principles underlying C.I.S.G. See infra part IV.B.l-4. 
91. See supra part IV.A.2. 
92. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 7(1), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  23, 19 I.L.M. 
at  673. While some representatives argued that the good faith requirement should 
apply only to the contracting parties, see U.N. Conference on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 1st Comm., 5th mtg., 41, 43, 44, a t  257-58, U.N. 
Doc. AKONF.97119 (19801, in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, a t  
478-79, the good faith requirement actually adopted in article 7(1) applies to the 
interpretation of the Convention as well, see id. 47, 49, 52, 54, 55, a t  258, in 
HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at  479; see also Paul Volken, The 
Vienna Convention: Scope, Interpretation, and Gap-Filling, in INTERNATIONAL SALE 
OF GOODS, supra note 1, at  19, 42 (The good faith requirement "was finally accept- 
ed as a general interpretation rule to be applied to the Convention as a whole."). 
93. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 
the Work of Its Eleventh Session, [I9781 M U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. Y.B. ¶ 57, 
at  36, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9lSER.A/1978, in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 1, a t  370. While some view the good faith requirement as an interpretive 
guideline only, see HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 1, $ 94, at  147, Professors 
Bianca and Bone11 conclude that the better view is that the requirement also ap- 
plies to the contracting parties. BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 1, at  84. Whether 
the good faith requirement of article 7(1) is deemed to apply only to interpretation 
or also to the parties, good faith appears to be a general principle of the Conven- 
tion. See id. at  85. As such, the good faith requirement may govern the parties 
when their dispute is covered but not expressly resolved by the Convention, for 
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with this good faith perspective. That rule prevents parties 
from entering final, exclusive agreements and then seeking to 
escape or unilaterally a1 ter unfavorable terms by pleading in 
bad faith the existence of prior or contemporaneous oral 
terms.g4 The parol evidence rule thus conforms to, indeed en- 
forces, the good faith principle made explicit in article 7. 
2. Articles 6 and 29 
The parol evidence rule also comports with the principle of 
party autonomy embodied in articles 6 and 29.95 Article 29, in 
then general principles become rules of decision. See id. 
94. See Gordon, supra note 16, at  647. 
95. See U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 7th 
plen. mtg., 'j[ 25, at  206, U.N. Doc. NCONF.97119 (1980), in HONNOLD, DOCUMEN- 
TARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at  741 (In explaining his rejection of a proposal to 
alter present article 29, the Canadian representative commented that "the Conven- 
tion . . . was based squarely on the doctrine of the autonomy of the will of the 
parties."); Working Group on the International Sale of Goods; Report on the Work of 
the Second Session, 7-18 December 1970, [I9711 I1 U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. Y.B. 
'jj 46, a t  55, U.N. Doc. NCN.9lSER.Nl971, in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 1, a t  61 (explaining that a predecessor of article 6 "emphasize[d] that 
the provisions of the Uniform Law are supplementary and yield to the agreement 
of the parties"); see also BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 1, at  80 (casting "the prin- 
ciple of the parties' autonomy" as one of the general principles underlying the 
Convention); Andre H. Friedman, The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Inter- 
national Sale of Goods, in 7 DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL AWS OF THE WORLD 1, 3 
(1988) (citing article 6 and concluding that "[the] primacy of the parties['] autono- 
my is the very essence of the Convention"). 
The principle of party autonomy is also manifest in article l(l)(b), which essen- 
tially permits qualifying parties to choose whether the Convention will govern their 
contract, see C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 1(1), l(l)(b), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at  22, 
19 I.L.M. at  672 (providing that the "Convention applies to contracts of sale of 
goods between parties whose places of business are in different States . . . when 
the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Con- 
tracting State" and thereby allowing parties, through the private international law 
principle that the law the parties designate will govern, to choose whether the 
Convention will apply to their contract), and in article 9, which permits usages 
expressly or impliedly adopted by the parties to trump conflicting provisions of 
C.I.S.G., see C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 9, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  24, 19 I.L.M. 
a t  674; Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Conference on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, art. 8, cmt. 5, at  19, U.N. Doc. NCONF.97119 (1980), 
in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at  409 ("Since usages which 
become binding on the parties do so only because they have been explicitly or 
implicitly incorporated into the contract, they will be applied rather than conflict- 
ing provisions of this Convention on the principle of party autonomy."); U.N. Con- 
ference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1st Comm., 6th mtg., 
1 77, a t  264, U.N. Doc. NCONF.97119 (1980), in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTO- 
RY, supra note 1, a t  485 (In the Argentine representative's view, the rules embod- 
ied in the predecessor of article 9 were manifestations of "the principle of the au- 
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derogation of article 11's provision that contracts "need not be 
concluded in or evidenced by writing,"96 authorizes parties to 
a written contract to require, as part of their contract, that any 
termination or modification be in writing.g7 Article 6 more ex- 
pansively enables "[tlhe parties [to] exclude the application of 
[the] Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary 
the effect of any of its  provision^."^^ The derogation permitted 
by article 6 need not be explicit; the parties may imply their 
intent to escape from all or part of the Conven t i~n .~~  The
tonomy of the will of the parties."); BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 1, a t  107 ("The 
fact that the parties are bound by usages to which they have agreed derives from 
the general principles of party autonomy (Article 6)."). 
96. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 11, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  24, 19 I.L.M. a t  
674. 
97. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 29(2), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  26, 19 I.L.M. 
at  677. Article 29(2) provides in full: 
A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modifica- 
tion or termination by agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise 
modified or terminated by agreement. However, a party may be precluded 
by his conduct from asserting such a provision to the extent that the 
other party has relied on that conduct. 
Id. 
98. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 6, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  23, 19 I.L.M. a t  
673. In spite of article 6's broad language, Professors Bianca and Bone11 argue that 
the parties may not escape article 7's application. BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 1, 
a t  93-94. 
99. A predecessor of article 6, article 3 of the Uniform Law on the Interna- 
tional Sale of Goods, explicitly stated that exclusion of the Uniform Law by the 
parties "may be express or implied." Working Group on the International Sale of 
Goods; Report on the Work of the Second Session, 7-18 December 1970, [I9711 I1 
U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. Y.B. 1 43, at  55, U.N. Doc. NCN.9ISER.Nl971, in 
HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, a t  61 (quoting U.L.I.S. art. 3). 
The reference to implicit exclusion was deleted, not to deny power to implicitly 
exclude application of the Uniform Law, but because "[slome representatives were 
concerned lest the special reference to 'implied' exclusion might encourage courts to 
conclude, on insufficient grounds, that the Law had been wholly excluded." Id. 
'I[ 45, a t  55. A later proposal to permit only express exclusion of the Convention 
was rejected. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
on the Work of Its Tenth Session, El9771 VIII U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade L. Y.B. 
¶'I[ 56-57, a t  29, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9lSER.A/1977, in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTO- 
RY, supra note 1, a t  322. According to several representatives, the version of article 
6, which with only numbering changes was finally adopted, permits both express 
and implied derogation. See U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, 1st Comm., 4th mtg., 1 4, a t  248, U.N. Doc. NCONF.97119 (1980), 
in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, a t  469 (The Chairman of the 
First Committee "considered that exclusion of the application of the Convention, 
derogation from its provisions or variation of their effect could be either express or 
implied, [and that] that was also apparently the conclusion which had emerged 
from the preparatory work."); id. 1 11, at 249, in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTO- 
RY, supra note 1, at  470 (According to the Norwegian representative, "the . . . text 
which[, with nonsubstantive changes, became article 61 . . . meant that derogation 
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parties' intent is controlling. loo 
The principles of party autonomy and respect for the intent 
of the parties contained in articles 6 and 29 are consistent with 
the parol evidence rule. As explained above, through the parol 
evidence rule, the court identifies and safeguards the parties' 
intent as to the effect of their writing.lO' If the parties intend 
their agreement to be an integration, the parol evidence rule 
prevents the fact finder from considering evidence to the con- 
trary.lo2 Absent the parol evidence rule, the fact finder might 
conclude that the contract embraces terms that the parties did 
not intend at the time of contracting to include in their agree- 
ment. Such a conclusion would violate the parties' autonomy to 
define the complete terms of their bargain. Application of the 
parol evidence rule thus advances the principles underlying 
articles 6 and 29. 
3. Article 9 
The parol evidence rule similarly conforms with the princi- 
ples underlying article 9. Article 9 provides that contracting 
parties are bound by their course of performance; their course 
of dealing; and well-known, widespread usages which the par- 
ties have not excluded through their agreemenf.lo3 The parol 
might be express or tacit."); id. 1 25, a t  250, in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at  471 (In the United Kingdom representative's view, "it was not 
necessary for the parties to indicate expressly that they had decided to exclude the 
provisions of the Convention and to apply another legal regime, as the existing 
text of article 5 [essentially the text adopted as article 61 might lead one to be- 
lieve."); see also HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 1, $8 76, 77, a t  126, 129 
(Because UNCITRAL did not clearly resolve the express-implied exclusion debate, 
"normal rules of construction of the contract apply to the question of exclusion or 
modification of the Convention." As a result, "[tlhe Convention may be excluded by 
the parties, but only by an express agreement or an agreement that is clearly 
implied in fact."); Rhodes, supra note 1, at  400, 403 (concluding "that the delegates 
reached an impasse in [and did not resolve] the express or implied exclusion de- 
bate"; though agreeing that "the stronger argument is . . . that parties may ex- 
clude the CISG by implication"). 
100. See U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1st 
Comm., 4th mtg., ¶ 11, a t  249, U.N. Doc. AKONF.97119 (1980), in HONNOLD, DOC- 
UMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, a t  470 (In the Norwegian representative's view, 
"[tlhe determining factor [in deciding whether the parties have derogated from the 
Convention] must always be the intention of the parties a t  the moment of conclud- 
ing the contract, whether or not such intention [has] been express or implied in 
article [81.">. 
101. See supra note 28, 29 and accompanying text. 
102. See supra notes 22, 25, 26 and accompanying text. 
103. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 9, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at  24, 19 I.L.M. at  
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evidence rule facilitates application of article 9.'04 As noted 
above, the parol evidence rule admits evidence of course of per- 
formance, course of dealing, and usages to supplement or ex- 
plain the terms of written contracts, whether integrated or 
not,lo5 thus allowing the fact finder to apply the rules of arti- 
cle 9 in outlining the contours of the parties' agreement. The 
parol evidence rule is thus consistent with the principles un- 
derlying article 9. 
4. Articles 12 and 96 
Likewise, the parol evidence rule is consistent with the 
principle underlying articles 12 and 96. Many C.I.S.G. provi- 
sions allow contracts to be effected and altered without a writ- 
ing.lo6 Article 96 restricts these provisions by authorizing 
Contracting States to declare that they will not be bound by 
any provision that allows contracts to be formed or altered 
674. Article 9 reads: 
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed 
and by any practices which they have established between themselves. 
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have im- 
pliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of 
which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in interna- 
tional trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to 
contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned. 
Id. 
104. See Legal Analysis of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (1980), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 
(1983) (C.I.S.G. and the U.C.C. both "give[] contractual effect ton trade usage and 
course of dealing.); BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 1, at  106 (noting that the treat- 
ment given course of dealing in articles 8 and 9 "almost literally corresponds with" 
the treatment given course of dealing by U.C.C. 9 1-205, a section that the U.C.C. 
parol evidence rule incorporates by reference, see U.C.C. 9 2-202(a)); HONNOLD, 
UNIFORM LAW, supra note 1, 9 120, a t  177 (describing the U.C.C. approach to 
usages of trade as similar to that of the Convention). Compare HILLMAN ET AL., 
supra note 21, 1 3.05[31, at  3-23 (Under the U.C.C., "[clourse of dealing and trade 
usage evidence should be admissible except where all of the evidence, considered 
preliminarily, clearly demonstrates that the parties specifically intended to exclude 
a course of dealing or usage of trade.") with C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 9, S. TREA- 
TY DOC. NO. 9, at  24, 19 I.L.M. at  674 (binding the parties, unless they otherwise 
agree, to their course of dealing as well as to well-known usages in the relevant 
trade). But cf: HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 1, 9 122, a t  179 (Article 9, not 
domestic law, dictates "the circumstances that make a usage applicable."). 
105. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
106. See, e.g., C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 11, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  24, 19 
I.L.M. at  674 ("A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing 
and is not subject to any other requirement as to form."); id. a t  art. 29(1), S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at  27, 19 I.L.M. at  677 ("A contract may be modified or termi- 
nated by the mere agreement of the parties."). 
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"other than in writing."lo7 Article 12 enforces article 96 by 
holding that: 
Any provision of article 11, article 29 or Part I1 of this 
Convention that allows a contract of sale or its modification 
or termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance or other 
indication of intention to be made in any form other than in 
writing does not apply where any party has his place of busi- 
ness in a Contracting State which has made a declaration 
under article 96 of this Convention.lo8 
Together, articles 12 and 96 "recognize[] that some States 
consider that it is an important element of public policy that 
contracts or their modification or abrogation be in writing."log 
The general principle underlying articles 12 and 96, then, is 
one of accommodation: accommodation of states' interest in 
encouraging, even requiring, that contracts be in ~ r i t i n g . " ~  
C.I.S.G. is so committed to this principle of accommodation that 
it does not allow parties to "derogate from or vary the effect of 
[article 121.""' 
107. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 96, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  41, 19 I.L.M. a t  
693-94. Article 96 provides: 
A Contracting State whose legislation requires contracts of sale to be con- 
cluded in or evidenced by writing may a t  any time make a declaration in 
accordance with article 12 that any provision of article 11, article 29, or 
Part I1 of this Convention, that allows a contract of sale or its modifica- 
tion or termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance, or other indica- 
tion of intention to be made in any form other than in writing, does not 
apply where any party has his place of business in that State. 
Id. 
108. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 12, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  24, 19 I.L.M. a t  
674. 
109. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Conference on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, art. 11, cmt. 1, at  20, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1980), 
in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, a t  410 (commenting on a pre- 
decessor of current article 12). 
110. See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 1, at  125 ("Article 12 aims at  accom- 
modating the special demands of those States whose legal systems impose the 
written form for contracts of international sales for purposes of validity, evidence 
and administrative control . . . ."). 
111. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 12, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  24, 19 I.L.M. a t  
674; see also C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 6, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  23, 19 I.L.M. 
a t  673 ("The parties may . . . , subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the ef- 
fect of any of [the Convention's] provisions."); Commentary on the Draft Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. 
Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 11, cmt. 3, a t  20, 
U.N. Doc. AKONF.97119 (1980), in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
1, a t  410 ("Since the requirement of writing in relation to the matters mentioned 
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The strong accommodationist principle underlying articles 
12 and 96 supports application of the parol evidence rule, for 
that rule seeks to effect the United States' interests in written 
contracts by encouraging parties to embody their contracts in 
writing, preventing "perjured or otherwise unreliable testimony 
of oral terms" to contradict the terms of a writing, and exclud- 
ing "prior agreements . . . superseded by the [written contract], 
under a theory of Thus, the parol evidence rule 
comports with the general principle of accommodation for 
states' interests in written contra~ts.''~ 
In sum, because the parol evidence rule conforms "with the 
general principles on which [the Convention] is based," the rule 
may be applied under article 7(2) to resolve the unsettled ques- 
in article [I21 is considered to be a question of public policy in some States, the 
general principle of party autonomy is not applicable to . . . article [12]. According- 
ly, article [I21 cannot be varied or derogated from by the parties."); BIANCA & 
BONEU, supra note 1, at  127 ("Article 12 is the only provision of the Convention 
which is of a mandatory character . . . ."). 
112. Gordon, supra note 16, at  647 (citing J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS 137 (3d ed. 1987)); see supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
But cf: Legal Analysis of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In- 
ternational Sale of Goods, supra note 104, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  6 (recom- 
mending that the U.S. not make an article 96 declaration; also noting that "[mlost 
delegates . . . , including the United States, concluded that formal requirements 
[are] inconsistent with modern commercial practice," thus suggesting that the poli- 
cies behind the parol evidence rule are not as strong in the international trade 
arena). 
113. I t  may be argued that articles 12 and 96 would support application of the 
parol evidence rule only if the US. had made an article 96 declaration. Because 
US. legislation does not uniformly require contracts to be in writing, however, 
such a declaration would not have been appropriate or even available to the U.S. 
See C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 96, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 96, a t  24, 19 I.L.M. a t  
674; Report of the First Committee, U.N. Conference on Contracts for the Interna- 
tional Sale of Goods, 1st Comm., art. 10, ¶ 7(iv), a t  91, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.97119 
(1980), in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at  663 (recording that 
a Netherlands' proposal-which would have allowed states to make an article 96 
declaration to require only certain types of contracts to be in writing-was reject- 
ed). But cf. Journal of Law & Commerce CISG Contracting States and Declarations 
Table, 12 J.L. & COM. 283, 286 (1993) (noting that "[tlhe People's Republic of Chi- 
na does not consider itself to be bound by . . . article 11 as well as the provisions 
in the Convention relating to the content of article l i "  even though China appar- 
ently did not make an article 96 declaration). Nor could the U.S. have lodged a 
reservation to C.I.S.G. provisions allowing contracts to be effected or modified with- 
out a writing, for "[nlo reservations are permitted except those expressly authorized 
in this Convention." C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 98, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, a t  42, 
19 I.L.M. a t  694. Thus, the US. appropriately adopted the Convention without 
making a declaration or reservation as to the Convention's oral contracting allow- 
ances. Just as  appropriately, the U.S. may apply the parol evidence rule in harmo- 
ny with the articles that accommodate states' interests in written contracts. 
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tion of what constitutes due consideration of extrinsic evidence 
in determining the parties' integrationist intent.'" 
As this Note has demonstrated, the parol evidence rule 
may be seen as an appropriately international application of 
article 8, or alternatively, as a rule, consistent with general 
principles underlying the Convention, that resolves the ques- 
tion of what constitutes "due consideration . . . [of] all relevant 
circumstances""5 in determining the parties' intent as to the 
effect of their writing. Under either of these perspectives, the 
parol evidence rule may legitimately be applied to contracts 
governed by the Convention. Thus, while the court in Beeing 
Metals failed to reveal the analysis supporting its holding that 
the parol evidence rule applies under C.I.S.G., and while com- 
mentators such as Professor Flechtner have contested that 
holding, this Note's analysis justifies the court's conclusion. 
This Note thus supplements the decision in Beijing Metals, 
strengthening that precedent while simultaneously laying bare 
the opinion's possible reasoning to attack by supporters of a 
strictly international interpretation of C.I.S.G. 
David H. Moore 
114. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 7(2), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9, at 24, 19 I.L.M. 
at 673. 
115. Id. art. 8(3). 
